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OVERVIEW  
Labelling theory is a perspective that emerged as a distinctive approach to criminology 
during the 1960s, and was a major seedbed of the radical and critical perspectives that 
became prominent in the 1970s. It represented the highpoint of an epistemological shift 
within the social sciences away from positivism – which had dominated criminological 
enquiry since the late-1800s – and toward an altogether more relativistic stance on the 
categories and concepts of crime and control. It inspired a huge amount of work throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s, and still resonates powerfully today. This short chapter maps out 
some of the ways in which labelling, deviance, media and justice interact at the levels of 
definition and process. It presents an overview and analysis of key mediatised labelling 
processes, such as the highly influential concept of moral panics. It discusses how the 
interconnections between labelling, crime and criminal justice are changing in a context of 
technological development, cultural change and media proliferation. The conclusion offers  
an assessment and evaluation of labelling theory’s long-term impact on criminology.  
 
THE ROOTS OF THE LABELLING PERSPECTIVE 
The labelling perspective emerged at a time of radical intellectual change in the 1960s. The 
intellectual problem, as labelling theorists saw it, was that the study of crime had narrowed 
into two key questions: 1) why do they do it? and 2) how do we stop them from doing it? 
Government bodies and funding agencies reinforced the notion that ‘they’ were different 
from ‘us’, and that ‘crime’ was entirely distinct from ‘criminal justice’. Such thinking had laid 
foundations for the resurgence of a separate academic discipline of ‘positivist criminology’, 
which functioned as policy science of crime, the criminal and crime control. There was an 
assumed consensus over what constituted crime, and the operations of criminal justice 
were seen as of interest only in terms of making them more effective in controlling crime. 
Yet nobody appeared to be asking why some behaviours were deemed criminal in certain 
contexts, while others were not. And why some people were deemed deviant and in need of 
correction or punishment, whilst others – who engaged in similar behaviours – were not.  
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Though Durkheim had discussed the problematic definition of crime in the late 19th century 
(Durkheim  1895/1964: 69-72), and scholars such as Frank Tannenbaum, George Herbert 
Mead and W. I. Thomas had been writing more or less directly about labelling processes 
since the 1930s, it is Howard Becker’s (1963) Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance 
that has become the best known and most influential statement of labelling theory. Building 
on the theoretical foundations of social constructionism and symbolic interactionism, 
Becker sought to problematise systematically precisely those questions that mainstream 
‘correctionalist’  criminology  left unexplored. He argued (1963: 14), ‘The same behaviour 
may be an infraction of the rules at one time and not at another; may be an infraction when 
committed by one person, but not when committed by another; some rules are broken with 
impunity, others are not. In short, whether a given activity is deviant or not depends in part 
on the nature of the act (that is whether or not it violates some rule) and in part on what 
other people do about it’. 
Understanding the highly selective nature of labelling, the equally selective nature of the 
social reaction to which it may or may not give rise, and the consequences for those who 
are labelled, required analysing complex and contested power relations as both micro-
interactional and macro-social processes. For Edwin Schur (1979: 160, italics in original) , the 
labelling perspective is thus concerned with both ‘definition and process at all the levels that 
are involved in the production of deviant situations and outcomes. Thus, the perspective is 
concerned not only with what happens to specific individuals when they are branded as 
deviant (‘labeling’ in the narrow sense) but also with the wider domains and processes of 
social definitions and collective rule-making that frequently lie behind such concrete 
applications of negative labels’.  
Key questions for labelling theorists therefore include: How are labels created or socially 
constructed? How are labels imposed? How and why do particular behaviours become 
defined as ‘normal’ or ‘deviant’? What enables labellers to impose their particular 
definitions upon behaviours, actions and situations? How does the labelling process work 
and with what consequences? 
 
KEY ISSUES/CONTROVERSIES 
Labelling, Media and Crime 
The mass media play at least a subordinate role in all the major theoretical perspectives 
attempting to understand crime and criminal justice. To illustrate this, the predominant 
theories of crime can be assembled in a simple model. For a crime to occur there are five 
logically necessary preconditions, which can be identified as: labelling; motive; means; 
opportunity; and the absence of controls (Reiner 2007: 80-90). The media potentially play a 
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part in each of these elements, and thus can affect levels of crime in a variety of ways (Greer 
and Reiner 2012: 256-61).  
 
Labelling  
For an act to be ‘criminal’ (as distinct from harmful, immoral, anti-social, etc.) it has to be 
labelled as such. This involves the creation of a legal category. It also requires the 
perception of the act as criminal by citizens and/or law enforcement officers if it is to be 
recorded as a crime. The media are an important factor in both processes, helping to shape 
the conceptual boundaries and recorded volume of crime.  
The role of the media in helping to develop new (and erode old) categories of crime has 
been emphasized in most of the classic studies of shifting boundaries of criminal law within 
the ‘labelling’ tradition. Becker’s (1963) seminal book Outsiders analysed the emergence of 
the Marijuana Tax Act in the USA in 1937, emphasizing the use of the media as a tool of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics and its moral entrepreneurship in creating the new statute. 
Since this pioneering work many studies have illustrated the crucial role of the media in 
shaping the boundaries of deviance and criminality, by creating new categories of offence, 
or changing perceptions and sensitivities, leading to fluctuations in apparent crime (Young, 
1971, Cohen, 1972, Hall et al, 1978). For example, Roger Graef’s celebrated 1982 fly-on-the-
wall documentary about the Thames Valley Police was a key impetus to reform of police 
treatment of rape victims (Greer and Reiner 2012: 256). This also contributed, however, to a 
rise in the proportion of victims reporting rape, and thus an increase in the recorded rate. 
Many other studies document media-amplified ‘crime waves’ and ‘moral panics’ about law 
and order (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009 ).  
What all these studies illustrate is the significant contribution of the media to determining 
the apparent level of crime. Increases and (perhaps more rarely) decreases in recorded 
crime levels are often due in part to the deviance construction and amplifying activities of 
the media .  
 
Motive  
A crime will not occur unless there is someone who is tempted, driven, or otherwise  
motivated to carry out the ‘labelled’ act. The media feature in many of the most commonly 
offered social and psychological theories of the formation of criminal dispositions. Probably 
the most influential sociological theory of how criminal motives are formed is Merton’s 
version of anomie theory (Merton 1938/1957), echoes of which are found in more recent 
work (See Special Issue of Theoretical Criminology 11/1 2007; Reiner 2007: 14-5, 84-5). The 
media play a key role in these accounts of the formation of anomic strain generating 
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pressures to offend. The media are pivotal in presenting for universal emulation images of 
affluent life-styles, which accentuate relative deprivation and generate pressures to acquire 
ever higher levels of material success regardless of the legitimacy of the means used.  
Psychological theories of the formation of motives to commit offences also often feature 
media effects as part of the process (Greer and Reiner 2012: 247-62). It has been claimed 
that the images of crime and violence presented by the media are a form of social learning, 
and may encourage crime by imitation or arousal effects. Others have argued that the 
media tend to erode internalized controls by disinhibition or desensitization through 
witnessing repeated representations of deviance (). 
 
Means  
It has often been alleged that the media act as an open university of crime, spreading 
knowledge of criminal techniques. This is often claimed in relation to particular causes 
célèbres or horrific crimes, for example during the 1950s’ campaign against crime and horror 
comics . A notorious case was the allegation that the murderers of Jamie Bulger had been 
influenced by the video Child’s Play 3 in the manner in which they killed the unfortunate 
toddler . A related line of argument is the ‘copycat’ theory of crime and rioting . Despite a 
plethora of research and discussion, the evidence that this is a major source of crime 
remains weak.  
 
Opportunity  
The media may increase opportunities to commit offences by contributing to the 
development of a consumerist ethos, in which the availability of tempting targets of theft 
proliferates. The domestic hardware and software of mass media use––TVs, videos, radios, 
CDs, personal computers, mobile phones––are the common currency of routine property 
crime, and their proliferation has been an important aspect of the spread of criminal 
opportunities.  
 
Absence of controls 
Motivated potential offenders, with the means and opportunities to commit offences, may 
still not carry out these crimes if effective social controls are in place. These might be 
external––the deterrent threat of sanctions represented in the first place by media made 
criminality the police–– or internal–– the still, small voice of conscience––what Eysenck has 
called the ‘inner policeman’.  
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A regularly recurring theme of respectable anxieties about the criminogenic consequences 
of media images of crime is that they erode the efficacy of both external and internal 
controls. They may undermine external controls by derogatory representations of criminal 
justice, for example ridiculing its agents, a key complaint at least since the days of Dogbery, 
resuscitated in this century by the popularity of comic images of the police, from the 
Keystone Cops onwards. Serious representations of criminal justice might undermine its 
legitimacy by becoming more critical, questioning, for example, the integrity and fairness, or 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the police. Negative representations of criminal justice 
could lessen public cooperation with the system, or potential offenders’ perception of the 
probability of sanctions, with the consequence of increasing crime.  
Probably the most frequently suggested line of causation between media representations 
and criminal behaviour is the allegation that the media undermine internalized controls, by 
regularly presenting sympathetic or glamorous images of offending. In academic form this is 
found in the psychological theories about disinhibition and desensitization, which were 
referred to in the section above on the formation of motives . In sum, there are several 
possible links between media representations of crime and criminal behaviour which are 
theoretically possible, and frequently suggested in criminological literature and political 
debate. In the next section I will review some of the research evidence examining whether 
such a link can be demonstrated empirically.  
 
Labelling, Media and Moral Panics  
The successful labelling of a particular situation or set of conditions as deviant and in need 
of amelioration can, in the extreme, result in ‘moral panic’. The term was first used by 
Young (1971) in his study of subcultures and drugtaking. Cohen (1972) developed and 
extended the concept in his analysis of the sensationalistic, heavy-handed and ultimately 
‘disproportionate’ reaction to the Mods and Rockers disturbances in an English seaside 
resort in 1964. Though the damage was in financial terms minor, Cohen traces the spiralling 
social reaction through initial intolerance, media stereotyping, moral outrage, increased 
surveillance, labelling and marginalisation, and deviancy amplification leading to further 
disturbances that seemed to justify the initial concerns. The flamboyant misbehaviour of 
youth subcultures, independent and sexually and economically liberated, affronted the 
post-War values of hard work, sobriety and deferred gratification. At a time of rapid social 
change, they were a visible index of a world that was slipping away – ‘folk devils’ who 
provided a crystallising focus for social anxiety and ‘respectable fears’. Cohen used the 
building blocks of labelling theory – social constructionism, symbolic interactionism, 
deviancy amplification, social psychology –  but also incorporated the lesser known 
academic literature on ‘disaster research’ to describe the various phases of a moral panic – 
warning, impact, inventory, reaction – and chart its progression.  
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Hall et al. (1978) politicised the concept by locating it within a broader political economy 
perspective in their analysis of a ‘mugging’ moral panic which, they argued, was constructed 
to address an escalating crisis in state hegemony. Drawing from an eclectic mix of 
influences, their account connects ‘new deviancy theory, news media studies and research 
on urban race relations with political economy, state theory and notions of ideological 
consent’ (Mclaughlin, 2008: 146). For some critical criminologists, it represents the high 
point of Marxist theorising about crime, law and order and the state. Whilst fully 
acknowledging the sophistication of this work, Cohen (2011) has nonetheless noted a wider 
tendency to over-politicise the concept at the expense of its sociological meaning and 
application. Hall (2007) has suggested in response that politicisation was a necessary 
developmental stage, and that the full explanatory potential of the moral panic concept 
was, in fact, only realised through its construction as ideology.  
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) developed Cohen’s discussion of moral panic by paying 
particular attention to the criteria that should be in place before it can be suggested that a 
‘moral panic’ is occurring. They identify five key features of the phenomenon: (i) concern (a 
reported condition or event generates anxiety); (ii) hostility (the condition or event is 
condemned and, where there are clearly identifiable individuals who can be blamed, these 
are labelled as ‘folk devils’); (iii) consensus (the negative social reaction is widespread and 
collective); (iv) disproportionality (the extent of the problem and the threat is poses are 
exaggerated); (v) volatility (media attention and the associated panic emerge suddenly and 
with intensity, but can dissipate quickly too). Media are central to all of these.  
‘Moral panic’ is one of the most widely used terms in the sociological analysis of crime and 
justice, and has transcended academic discourses to become commonplace in political 
rhetoric and popular conversation (Altheide, 2009). Given its prolific usage, it is surprising 
that few commentators have subjected the concept to sustained and rigorous critical 
investigation. With the split in the criminological left in the late-1970s, the concept was 
dismissed by Left Realists as ‘left idealism’, and accused of obfuscating the painful ‘realities’ 
of criminal victimisation by propagating the view that ‘the crime problem’ is socially 
constructed (Young, 1979). In exploring the anatomy of the concept, critics have queried the 
notions of ‘disproportionality’ and ‘volatility’: the first, since this assumes a superior 
knowledge of the objective reality of the issue against which the reaction is measured, and a 
corresponding assumption of what a ‘proportionate’ reaction would look like . The second, 
because in a contemporary multi-media world characterised by ontological insecurity and 
state of a permanent free-floating anxieties, the notion of discreet, self-contained, volatile 
moral panics may need some rethinking (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995). Cohen has 
responded to all of these criticisms. But such critical interventions, both from within and 
outside of criminology, have barely interrupted the general tendency to arbitrarily apply the 
concept to explain everything from global warning to ‘Swine Flu’. The broadly uncritical 
application of the moral panic concept has led Garland (2008) to reassert two elements of 
the original analysis, which are absent from many contemporary studies: (i) the moral 
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dimension of the social reaction – most issues can be moralised, but many are not in and of 
themselves ‘moral’, and cannot automatically be analysed as such; and (ii) the idea that the 
deviant conduct in question is somehow symptomatic of a wider problem – a threat to 
established values, or a particular way of life. Struggles over the power to label and to label 
effectively via media discourses, of course, remain fundamental to the moralisation of 
particularly ‘social problems’, the identification of folk devils, the persuasive representation 
of threats to particular forms of social existence, and the prescription of ameliorative action.   
 
Labelling and Trial by Media  
Another way in which the news media are directly involved in labelling is the phenomenon 
of ‘trial by media’ (Greer and McLaughlin 2011, 2013). ‘Trial by media’ can be defined as a 
dynamic, impact-driven, news media-led process by which individuals – who may or may not 
be publicly known – are tried and sentenced in the ‘court of public opinion’. The targets and 
processes of ‘trial by media’ can be diverse, and may range from pre-judging the outcome of 
formal criminal proceedings against ‘unknowns’ to the relentless pursuit of high-profile 
celebrity personalities and public figures deemed to have offended in some way against an 
assumed common morality.  
Despite their clear diversity, such ‘trials’ share certain core characteristics. In each case, the 
news media behave as a proxy for ‘public opinion’ and seek to exercise parallel functions of 
‘justice’ to fulfil a role perceived to lie beyond the interests or capabilities of formal 
institutional authority. Due process and journalistic objectivity can give way to 
sensationalist, moralising speculation about the actions and motives of those who stand 
accused in the news media spotlight. Judicial scrutiny of ‘hard evidence’ yields ground to 
‘real time’ dissemination of disclosures from paid informants and hearsay and conjecture 
from ‘well placed sources’. Since the news media substitute for the prosecution, judge and 
jury, the target may find themselves rendered defenceless. The default position is ‘guilty 
until proven innocent’. Those found ‘guilty’ will be subjected to righteous ‘naming and 
shaming’ followed by carnivalesque condemnation and ridicule. The public appeal of ‘trial 
by media’ is evidenced by increased circulation and web traffic . And by no means is it 
restricted to the British press.  
Thus, in recent years police commissioners, senior politicians, banking executives and, in the 
UK, the entire political establishment, as well as countless members of the public who are 
suspected of, but not yet charged with, any range of alleged criminal activities, have been 
subjected to mediatised scandal and trial by media (Greer and Mclaughlin 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013). The results of such high-profile labelling and public shaming, depending on the 
target, can range from deep and lasting reputational damage, public apologies, high-level 




Labelling, Media and Criminal Justice  
Powerful organisations and institutions tend to hold a distinct advantage in defining the 
nature of reality as represented via news media. Despite considerable variation in 
theoretical and methodological approach, decades of research has confirmed that the 
institutionally powerful enjoy privileged positions as ‘primary definers’ at the top of the 
‘hierarchy of credibility’, and that a pro-establishment perspective is structurally and 
culturally advantaged, if not necessarily guaranteed in news media representations (Ericson, 
et al. 1991; Hall, et al. 1978). Historically, then, the power to label has tended to rest more 
or less firmly in the hands of those who command institutional authority. There is good 
evidence to suggest, however, that with the proliferation and diversification of media in 
recent decades, the power of institutional authority to effectively ‘define how things are’ 
and set the terms of public debate, is becoming increasingly contested and unstable.  
In a digital multi-media age, a proliferation of news platforms, sites and formats has been 
paralleled by a rapidly expanding array of news sources and producers of content, leading to 
the creation of an unprecedented amount of potentially newsworthy information, and a 
remarkable number of ‘news spaces’ in which to broadcast/publish it. In the process, 
increasingly sophisticated, interactive news audiences are reconstituted as consumers – 
once content to be told what the news is, now increasingly interested in being part of the 
production process. Armed with cellphones, Blackberries or iPhones, all citizens are 
potential ‘citizen journalists’. A photo can be taken on a mobile phone, tweeted on 
Twitter.com, picked up by other users, and disseminated like a virus online. Internet 
monitoring by mainstream news media outlets means that dramatic amateur photographic, 
audio or video content can become headline news. Citizen journalism has been instrumental 
not only in providing newsworthy images, but also in defining the news itself – in shaping 
representations of key global events. From the police brutality against Rodney King filmed 
by camcorder in Los Angeles in 1991, to the 7/7 London bombings of 2005, to Hurricane 
Katrina, street protests in Tehran, and the Haiti earthquake, many of the defining images 
that now form a key part of the ‘official record’ of events were taken with hand-held 
recording devices and posted on social media sites. The emergence of the citizen journalist 
carries significant implications for official institutions that would seek to control the 
representing of crime and justice in the news. This phenomenon has been seen as a 
significant modification of existing power relations, offering what has been called 
‘synopticon’ (Mathiesen 1997) , providing the mass of the population with some potential to 
record elite deviance. 
The police can no longer simply ‘deny out of existence’ incidents of police violence in public 
protest situations, since these are ever-more likely to be captured on camera and broadcast 
to the world (Greer and Mclaughlin 2010, 2012). The same can be said of governments that 
would engage in larger scale abuses of their people and seek to conceal this from 
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international scrutiny. And politicians or public officials, who may previously have fiddled 
expenses, taken bribes, engaged in illicit affairs when they should have been attending to 
the affairs of state, have all become more ‘visible’ and, thus, more vulnerable to public 
exposure, labelling, trial by media, and mediatised justice.  
The democratisation of public involvement with the news production process, and the ‘new 
visibility’ (Thompson, 2005) to which institutional and state authority are continually 
subjected, are altering the dynamics of ‘communication power’ that shape our constructed 
realities. Of course, citizen journalists are neither automatically nor naturally imbued with 
cultural or official authority: they are not ‘authorised knowers’, who command access to 
mainstream news media ‘as of right’. Their position in the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ is entirely 
precarious and contingent. Media access is not granted because of who citizen journalists 
are, but rather because of where they are and what they have. Their credibility and 
authenticity as news sources derives from their capacity to provide ‘factual’ visual evidence 
of ‘live events’ which, in a multi-platform news media market, constitutes an important and 
cost-effective resource for ‘making news’. Nevertheless, citizens are becoming increasingly 
involved in the processes of public labelling and social construction that determine what, 
and who, is defined as honest or corrupt, competent or incompetent, legitimate and 
illegitimate, compliant or deviant. As such, they are centrally involved in the reconfiguration 
of notions of ‘crime’ and ‘justice’ in multi-media worlds.  
 
Labelling Theory: Evaluation and Critique 
The labelling perspective has transformed criminological theory and practice since the 
1960s. It has made many permanently valuable contributions, above all the recognition of 
criminal law and justice as problematic research areas, that shape at least as much as they 
control crime. Criminology conferences and textbooks today devote as much attention to 
research on and analysis of criminal justice, from a non-correctionalist standpoint, as they 
do to the study of offending, a legacy (albeit often unrecognised) of labelling theory. The 
two sub-fields that the authors of this chapter have spent most of their careers researching 
(policing, and media representations of crime/criminal justice) were almost entirely absent 
from criminologists’ agendas until the 1960s, and the questions raised then by labelling 
theorists. The problematic character of crime statistics, now universally recognised, is 
another contribution of labelling theorists. These impacts reflect the labelling perspective, 
but its influence is largely unacknowledged, and the developments have come to be taken 
for granted and domesticated within mainstream criminology.  
What is more questionable is the imperialistic version of labelling theory that was 
trumpeted in its heyday, and made large claims about itself as offering a total theory of 
crime. This grandiose version of labelling theory originated and flourished as the criminology 
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of the 1960s counter-culture, and could only be plausible as a general theory in that 
context. 
The imperialistic version claimed that concepts of crime were entirely relative and 
dependent on perceptions and labelling. It further suggested that labelling and social 
reaction were the principal explanations of crime and deviance. These claims are epitomised 
by two frequently cited quotes from key architects of the perspective. The relativity  
assertion is captured by Becker’s statement that ‘deviance is not a quality of the act… but of 
the application… of rules and sanctions’ (Becker 1963). The explanatory power of labelling is 
asserted most explicitly by Lemert: ‘Older sociology tended to rest heavily upon the idea 
that deviance leads to social control… (T)he reverse idea i.e. that social control leads to 
deviance, is equally tenable and the potentially richer premise for studying deviance in 
modern society’ (Lemert 1967). 
Both claims have some validity, but the exaggerated imperialistic versions, postulated by 
Becker, Lemert and others, were neither new, nor true without considerable qualification. 
Criminology before labelling theory (and indeed even nowadays) often took the concept of 
crime for granted. But its problematic character had already been emphasised by Durkheim 
and others. Seeing the making and enforcement of criminal law as a part of criminology was 
indeed acknowledged by some criminologists long before the labelling revolution. Moreover 
it was assumed by criminal lawyers, both in textbooks and judicial decisions (Proprietary 
Articles Trade Assn. v. Alt. Gen. for Canada [ 1931 ] AC at 32, per Lord Atkin). Legal scholars 
had studied the emergence and change of criminal laws long before the advent of labelling 
theory (e.g. Hall 1935/1952). Recognising the historical and social diversity of what precisely 
is criminalised at different times and places (Reiner 2007: Chap.2; Lacey and Zedner 2012) 
does not entail complete relativity. As Hart suggested persuasively, there seems to be a 
‘minimum content of natural law’, activities that are regulated in all societies because they 
are conditions of viable social existence, even though the precise content and manner of 
proscription and sanctioning is variable (Hart 1961: Chapter IX, Part II).  
The recognition of labelling as a cause of crime was also not entirely new, and had been 
anticipated even by some criminologists in the positivist tradition (most explicitly Wilkins 
1964, whose concept of deviance amplification in turn influenced labelling theorists). Whilst 
it is the case, as Lemert claims, that often ‘social control leads to deviance’ it is disputable 
whether it is the ‘richer premise for studying deviance’. Lemert’s claim rests on the 
assumption that ‘secondary deviance’, which follows labelling, is more pervasive and 
problematic than ‘primary deviance’, which precedes it. But this is an empirical question 
that is likely to vary in different times and places, and with regard to different kinds of 
deviance and social reaction, not a ‘premise’.  
Any plausibility the imperialistic claims of labelling theory had derived from the limited 
nature in practice of their empirical research. These tended to concentrate on marginal or 
exotic forms of deviance, which lend themselves to being seen as harmful or problematic 
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not intrinsically but primarily if not solely because of labelling: marijuana use, the bohemian 
subculture of jazz musicians (Becker 1963); ‘hustlers, beats and others’ (Polsky, 1967); 
‘crimes without victims’ (Schur, 1965). An early critique castigated this pithily as the 
‘sociology of nuts, sluts and “preverts” (sic)’ (Liazos 1972).  
The labelling theory pioneers’ focus on the dramatic and colourful made it much easier to 
ignore the harms done by some primary deviance. They concentrated on the creation of 
crime by the labelling activities of low-level control agents, reversing the moral assessments 
of criminal law and justice – as explicitly advocated by Becker in his call for criminologists to 
ask ‘Whose Side Are We On?’ (1967). This not only neglected the harms done by some 
crime, but bracketed out its structural causes, and the structural determinants of control 
activity – law, culture, political economy, wider social patterns and institutions (as Gouldner 
argued in his 1968 repost to Becker ‘The Sociologist As Partisan’). This critique stimulated 
the morphing of labelling theory into more politically radical forms of ‘new criminology’ and 
‘deviance theory’ in the 1970s (the core classics were Cohen 1971; Taylor, Walton and 
Young 1973;; as well as the seminal studies discussed extensively in this paper, Young 1971; 
Cohen 1972; Hall et al 1978). 
Labelling theory has had a huge impact, fundamentally shifting the criminological paradigm 
away from a taken for granted correctionalist stance, and stimulating a variety of forms of 
critical perspective. Much of its influence is now hidden, domesticated in the proliferating 
analyses of policing, media, and criminal justice. Although the sweeping claims of its 
originators are hard to sustain, its legacy lives on explicitly in contemporary cultural 
criminology and other qualitative and critical approaches. 
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